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Federal Taxation of
State Tax Credits
By Alan L. Feld
Federal and state legislators have long used the
taxing power to provide benefits as well as to
impose burdens. Relief from the imposition of tax
leaves money in a taxpayer’s hands that otherwise
would have gone to the government. Some benefit
provisions smooth out perceived difficulties created
by the tax structure itself, but many others serve as
substitutes for direct expenditures. A dollar trans-
mitted through the tax system enriches recipients
just as much as a direct government grant. The
extensive literature on tax expenditures canvasses
and debates these effects but focuses chiefly on
federal income taxation.1 State legislators also have
adopted this strategy and often provide tax incen-
tives for favored activities. State tax incentives
reward charitable giving,2 economic development,3
motion picture production,4 environmental reme-
diation,5 renewable energy, and many other activi-
ties. Like their federal counterparts, state legislators
may find conferring tax benefits to be more attrac-
tive than appropriating direct payments. Those tax
law subsidies often become permanent because
they avoid the annual review given to appropria-
tions. They also permit legislators to describe the
benefits as tax cuts rather than as increases in
spending. Further, when a state constitution bars or
limits gifts of state funds to private parties,6 the tax
credit alternative provides a simple mechanism for
evading that limitation.7
The state and federal income tax systems operate
mostly in parallel, each calculating its respective tax
under its own rules. A state income tax may incor-
porate elements of the federal tax in its definitions
and calculations, but state rules determine the mea-
sure of the levy. State income taxes paid or accrued
give rise to federal tax deductions8 — and any
subsequent recovery of a deducted amount must be
included in federal income9 — but for the most part,
the federal income tax ignores how state income
taxes are calculated, including state tax expendi-
tures.10 However, when a state tax system provides
a taxpayer with a net benefit, there is a correspond-
ing effect in the federal tax system. Increasing a
taxpayer’s wealth mirrors the effect of a direct
grant, and the federal income tax properly takes
that enrichment into account.
This article explores the federal income tax treat-
ment of state incentive tax credits, focusing on the
Tax Court’s recent opinion in David J. Maines11 and
an earlier opinion in George H. Tempel.12 Maines
examined the federal tax consequences of specific
incentive state tax credits, applying general income
definition rules to determine the proper federal tax
treatment. Tempel addressed the character of a state
credit as a capital asset. The opinions raise at least
two kinds of questions: when the taxpayer should
take the benefits of a state tax credit into account
and what the tax character of the benefit should be.
1See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, ‘‘Tax
Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology,’’ 99 Harv. L. Rev. 491
(1985).
2See Colo. Rev. Stat. section 39-22-522.
3N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law sections 955-969; and N.Y. Tax Law
section 606(j).
4Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 62, section 6(f).
5CCA 200211042.
6N.Y. Const. Art. VII, section 8.
7See Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563
U.S. 125 (2011) (challenge to a tax credit as opposed to a
government expenditure lacked standing under Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968)).
8Section 164, subject to the alternative minimum tax.
9Code section 111 and reg. sec. 1.111-1(a).
10ILM 201105010.
11David J. Maines v. Commissioner, 144 T.C. 123 (2015).
12George H. Tempel v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 341 (2011).
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Whether to Include a State Credit in Income
If a state simply pays an individual for engaging
in a desirable activity, the payment ordinarily con-
stitutes income for federal income tax purposes. A
nonrefundable incentive tax credit resembles a di-
rect cash payment from the state, applied against
the state tax. The credit enriches the taxpayer by
reducing state tax liability, but the taxpayer does
not include it in income for federal tax purposes.
One justification for this is that paying state tax
would generally give rise to a federal deduction,13
so that the income from receiving the credit and the
deduction from paying the tax would simply net
out.14 The offset, however, does not apply in all
cases. Netting will not occur if the taxpayer does
not claim a deduction for state income tax purposes.
Thus, a taxpayer who receives cash instead of a
credit and uses it to pay the state income tax would
not benefit from a federal deduction if the taxpayer
claims the standard deduction, elects to deduct
sales tax instead of income tax, or is subject to the
alternative minimum tax. Nevertheless, both the
IRS and the courts have excluded from income the
receipt of nonrefundable credits that reduce state
income tax liability.15
The exclusion reduces potential administrative
complexity. State incentives can take the form of
income tax deductions as well as credits. The ratio-
nale for including state tax credit subsidies in
income should extend to benefits from deductions
as well. Distinguishing deductions that constitute
subsidies from those more closely related to the
structure of an income tax would require close
analysis and often result in disputed determina-
tions. The analysis might vary from state to state.
For most taxpayers, the state deduction, if included
in income, would produce an offsetting federal tax
deduction. The exclusion of state tax credits and
deductions that reduce state tax liability from fed-
eral income eliminates the need to make adminis-
trative determinations that yield relatively little
revenue.
Maines
When the state tax credit does more than reduce
state income tax liability and leaves the taxpayer
with cash, the result changes, and the federal tax
system takes the cash into account. The taxpayers in
Maines had benefited from three New York state tax
credits. New York enacted its Empire Zones (EZs)
program to stimulate investment and business de-
velopment and to create jobs in impoverished areas
in the state. Businesses can apply to be certified and
to qualify for EZ tax credits. The credits vary
depending on the amount of qualifying business
activity. The EZ investment credit consists of 8
percent of the cost of tangible property in an EZ that
meets specific other conditions. Corporate taxpay-
ers apply the credits to their franchise tax liability.
Passthrough entities get credits for use against the
personal income tax liability of partners or mem-
bers. New York calls the credits overpayments of
income tax. Taxpayers may carry forward unused
credits or in some circumstances may receive 50
percent of the unused credit as a refund. A second
credit, the EZ wage credit, consists of a percentage
of the business payroll of a qualified business in the
EZ. The statute applies this credit in the same way
as the EZ investment credit.
The taxpayers in Maines owned an S corporation
and a limited liability company taxable as a part-
nership. Both business entities qualified to receive
the EZ investment and wage credits. The taxpayers
wiped out their state income tax liability with a
combination of other tax credits and part of the EZ
credits and paid no New York income tax. They
received substantial amounts denominated as state
income tax refunds. The taxpayers argued that the
tax benefit rule applied to exclude the refunds from
federal income: Because they had paid no state
income tax and therefore took no deduction for it, a
state income tax refund should not be included in
income.16 The Tax Court responded that the label
New York affixed to the payment was not the
controlling factor; the character of the payment was.
It viewed the refunds as subsidies from New York
to the taxpayers. The court held that while receipt of
credits that reduce New York income tax is not a
taxable event, the refund produced a taxable acces-
sion to wealth, includable in income.
The Tax Court employed a slightly different
analysis to the third credit. The S corporation
owned by David Maines and Tami Maines was
entitled to the Qualified Empire Zone Enterprise
(QEZE) real property tax credit. The amount of the
credit equaled the real property taxes previously
paid by the corporation during the relevant period.
The credit passed through to the Maineses, who
used part of the credit to offset New York income
tax liability and received the remainder as a refund.
The commissioner and the taxpayers again differed
regarding the application of the tax benefit rule. The
taxpayers argued that because they had claimed no
prior federal income tax deduction for New York
income taxes and because the credit refunds were
denominated overpayments of income tax, the tax
13See ILM 200238041.
14Cf. section 108(e)(2).
15Rev. Rul. 79-315, 1979-2 C.B. 27; and Tempel, 136 T.C. 341. 16See section 111.
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benefit rule required the refunds to be excluded
from income. They also argued that the S corpora-
tion, not the individual taxpayers, had paid the real
property taxes that constituted the measure of the
credit. However, the Tax Court agreed with the
commissioner. Despite the label, the credit actually
constituted a refund of the real property taxes
previously paid by the S corporation, the federal tax
benefit of which had effectively passed through to
the Maineses. The Tax Court accordingly applied
the tax benefit rule to include the refunds in income.
Constructive Receipt
The Tax Court in Maines addressed the tax con-
sequences to a taxpayer entitled to a refund of 50
percent of the credit who elects instead to carry
forward the full amount of the credit.17 It applied
the doctrine of constructive receipt18 to include in
income the amount of the refund. This result seems
wrong. The Tax Court cited the provision of the
regulations that treats income as constructively
received if made available for the taxpayer to draw
upon if desired. The taxpayer’s power to claim a
refund meets this test. But the regulations limit the
reach of constructive receipt if the taxpayer’s con-
trol of receipt is subject to substantial limitations. In
this case, to claim $1 of refund available under the
New York credit, the taxpayer had to give up $2 of
carryover to the following year. Without discussion,
the Tax Court apparently treated this reduction of
future credit as an insubstantial limitation. On the
contrary, the loss of a 2-for-1 offset against future
state tax liability would seem to meet the substan-
tial limitation test and bar constructive receipt. The
regulations treat as a substantial limitation a loss of
three months’ earnings on early redemption of a
year-long certificate of deposit.19 Loss of a substan-
tial future tax credit should likewise constitute a
substantial limitation.
Moreover, until the taxpayer acts, the effect of the
credit conferred by the state remains in doubt. The
taxpayer may either claim the 50 percent refund or
apply the full amount of the credit carryforward
against future state tax. Inclusion in income should
occur when something definitively changes the
credit from part of the state’s tax calculation to an
accession to wealth.
The Tax Court opinion leaves unresolved the
federal tax treatment of the taxpayer in subsequent
years. Suppose the taxpayer applies the carried-
forward credit in the following year to reduce state
income tax. Presumably, under the Tax Court’s
view, because the taxpayer recognized the amount
of the refund as constructively received, the tax-
payer should claim a deduction in the later year for
the amount of income previously included. The
taxpayer would have used up the credit without the
kind of accession to wealth anticipated by the
constructive receipt doctrine. But what statutory
provision authorizes the deduction? The ‘‘loss’’
created by using the credit against state income tax
does not fit well within the statutory categories in
section 165(c); it does not constitute a loss incurred
in a trade or business or in a transaction entered
into for profit, nor is it a casualty loss. Constructive
receipt would create an unduly harsh result if the
taxpayer could claim no deduction.
Tempel
The taxpayers and the government in Maines
both relied on an earlier tax court case, Tempel, in
support of their respective positions. George and
Georgetta Tempel donated a qualified conservation
easement on land they owned in Colorado to a
charity in 2004. Colorado provided a tax credit for
that type of donation, up to a maximum of $260,000.
They valued the easement at $836,500 and claimed
the maximum income tax credit from the state of
Colorado of $260,000. Colorado allowed taxpayers
to obtain a limited refund if the state had a budget
surplus for the year, but it had none in the year of
the donation. Colorado also allowed taxpayers to
carry forward any unused credits or to transfer
credits to others who could then offset their own tax
liability. The Tempels sold most of their unused
credits at a discount from their face amount, receiv-
ing a total of $82,500 in exchange for $110,000 of
their credit. They reported the sales as giving rise to
short-term capital gains of $77,603, after they de-
ducted from the sale proceeds as basis a portion of
the expenses incurred in connection with the ease-
ment donation. The Tax Court treated the state tax
credit as a capital asset and the proceeds of the sales
as short-term capital gains but disallowed the
claimed basis offset as outlays unrelated to the
credit.
The Maines taxpayers argued that Tempel held
that taxpayers do not include the receipt of refund-
able credits in income. The Tax Court noted, how-
ever, that the credits in Tempel were only potentially
refundable and that no refund was available in the
year the Tempels received and sold the credits.
Their credits never led to cash refunds. The case
accordingly did not constitute authority for exclud-
ing the refunds in Maines from income.
17While the Maineses did not carry the credits forward, the
court said the case was one of 11 unconsolidated cases concern-
ing federal tax treatment of the New York credits. Maines, 144
T.C. at 128 n.5.
18Reg. section 1.451-2(a).
19Reg. section 1.451-2(a)(2).
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Capital Gain or Ordinary Income on Sale?
The capital asset holding in Tempel deserves
further analysis. Although there may have been
little practical difference to the Tempels between
ordinary income and short-term capital gain once
the court disposed of the basis claim, a taxpayer in
a subsequent case could retain a credit for a year
and a day and obtain long-term treatment on sale.
Section 1221 defines a capital asset as property that
does not fall into any of eight specific exceptions.
The Tax Court said that the Colorado credit the
taxpayers sold constituted property and that none
of the statutory exceptions applied. It believed it
was bound by Arkansas Best20 to limit exclusions
from capital asset treatment to the exceptions in the
statute, concededly inapplicable, and to substitute-
for-ordinary-income cases.
The Court in Tempel rejected a series of argu-
ments that the sale proceeds substituted for ordi-
nary income and that they should therefore be
treated as ordinary income. The commissioner ar-
gued that the sale proceeds substituted for a tax
refund that would have been includable as ordinary
income, but the Tax Court countered that no state
law opportunity to obtain a refund existed in 2004.
The commissioner also argued that the credit’s
potential to reduce state tax liability produces the
economic equivalent of ordinary income. By selling
rather than using the credits, the taxpayer increases
its section 164 deduction and reduces taxable in-
come; in that sense, the sales proceeds substitute for
income. The Tax Court rejected this argument as
well, stating that a reduction in tax liability is not an
accession to wealth and that a taxpayer who has an
increased section 164 deduction has not received
any income.
The Tax Court acknowledged that the case did
not fit the purposes ascribed to capital gain treat-
ment by the courts: to provide some relief from
taxation in one year of appreciation accrued over a
substantial period21 or to alleviate the effects of
inflation.22 The Tempels’ tax credit involved neither
of those issues.
Nor did the court seek to reconcile the result with
the lottery proceeds cases. Five circuit courts have
considered the question whether the sale of peri-
odic lottery payments for a lump sum gives rise to
capital gain treatment.23 All concluded that it does
not — that the sale proceeds constituted a substitute
for ordinary income — but their rationales have
differed. The value of almost any asset consists of
the discounted present value of the income ex-
pected from the asset, so that in some sense every
sale substitutes for the future ordinary income. To
distinguish ordinary income from capital gain on
sale, the substitute for ordinary income argument
must contain something more. The most recent
lottery case, Womack, noted several important dif-
ferences between lottery rights and the typical
capital asset. First, the sale of a capital asset cap-
tures the increased value of the underlying asset.
Second, the taxpayer makes an underlying invest-
ment in a capital asset. Third, a sale of lottery rights
transfers a right to income already earned, not a
right to earn income in the future. Fourth, a capital
asset has the potential to earn income in the future
based on the owner’s actions, but lottery winners
are entitled to their income by virtue of owning the
property. Lottery rights lack these characteristics.
If we substitute the state tax credit for the lottery
winnings in the analysis, the same arguments point
to ordinary income treatment. The sale of a tax
credit does not capture increased value. The tax-
payer makes no underlying investment in the asset.
The right transferred represents income already
earned, not a right to earn income in the future. And
recipients of tax credits are entitled to their income
by virtue of owning the property, not future actions.
In two earlier cases, the Tax Court had developed
a multifactor test for treating specific rights as
capital assets. The test originated in James E. Foy,24 a
case involving contract rights to a franchiser, and
received endorsement in William T. Gladden,25 in-
volving the sale of water rights. The six factors
were: the origin of the rights; how they were
acquired; whether they represented an equitable
interest in a capital asset; whether the transfer of
rights merely substituted the source from which the
taxpayer would have received ordinary income;
whether substantial investment risks were associ-
ated with the rights (and if so, whether they were
included in the transfer); and whether the rights
primarily represented compensation for personal
services. The Tempel court declined to apply this test
to the state tax credit, restricting the test to cases
involving contract rights.
A subsequent chief counsel advice26 agreed that a
transferable state tax credit that does not fall within
the statutory exclusions constitutes a capital asset.
20Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
21Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport Inc., 364 U.S. 130
(1960).
22Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
23Womack v. Commissioner, 510 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2007);
Prebola v. Commissioner, 482 F.3d 610 (2d Cir. 2007); Watkins v.
Commissioner, 447 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2006); Lattera v. Commis-
sioner, 437 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 2006); and United States v. Maginnis,
356 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2004).
24Foy v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 50 (1985).
25William T. Gladden v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 209 (1999), rev’d
on other grounds, 262 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2001).
26CCA 201147024.
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The chief counsel advice affirmed that, ordinarily, a
taxpayer who qualifies for a state tax credit that can
be applied only against current or future state tax
liability does not have to include it in gross income.
Citing Tempel, it said a transfer of the credit for
value constitutes a sale. Basis is zero. Disagreeing
on this point with the Tax Court, the chief counsel
advice approved the application of the Foy-Gladden
multiple-factor test to determine capital asset sta-
tus. It said the same test that applies to contract
rights should also apply to other kinds of property.
It did not spell out how the application of the six
factors leads to capital asset treatment for the state
tax credit. It also did not cite an earlier and contrary
chief counsel advice27 conclusion, which said that
sale of a Missouri remediation tax credit resulted in
ordinary income.
But even treating the credit as a capital asset, the
Tax Court and the chief counsel advice failed to take
into account a more fundamental issue. As they
noted, the code defines a capital asset as ‘‘property’’
held by the taxpayer. Not every valuable right
constitutes property for this purpose.28 A state tax
deduction or a nonrefundable credit constitutes a
beneficial part of the calculation of a taxpayer’s
liability to the state but does not itself constitute
property. A refundable credit ripens into a property
right when the taxpayer obtains a benefit indepen-
dently of the state income tax calculation. At that
point it crosses the line between the two tax systems
and becomes an accession to the taxpayer’s wealth.
It is hard to see how a taxpayer can become the
owner of property that constitutes a capital asset
without first acquiring the property. That acquisi-
tion constitutes a realization event that requires
inclusion in income.
A nonrefundable credit that a taxpayer sells to
another taxpayer becomes an accession to the
wealth of the seller no later than the time of sale.
The credit then ceases to act as part of the taxpayer’s
calculation of state tax and becomes independently
valuable. The sales price determines the value. The
proper tax treatment for the Tempels should have
begun with inclusion in ordinary income of the
independent value they enjoyed from the credit, as
measured by the sales proceeds. The sale of the
credit then resulted in a second realization event
but with no gain because the amount realized
equaled the adjusted basis. As an analogy, consider
an employee who expects to receive shares of the
employer’s stock as a bonus. When the shares are
granted, the employee sells them. The employee has
neither income nor property until the shares are
received. When that occurs, the employee takes
their value into account as ordinary income and
takes a property right. The subsequent sale pro-
duces capital gain.
Treatment of a Purchaser of a State Tax Credit
For the purchaser of the state tax credit, the credit
should qualify as a property right. Its adjusted basis
equals the purchase price. When the purchaser
applies the credit to satisfy state tax liability, a
transfer of the property occurs, constituting a real-
ization event. As with any transfer of property in
satisfaction of a liability, the purchaser realizes gain
or loss in the amount of the liability satisfied less the
allocable portion of the adjusted basis. The use of
appreciated property to satisfy an indebtedness
results in gain recognition,29 and the character of the
property as a state tax credit should not alter that
result.
Conclusion
State income tax credits ordinarily affect the
federal income tax of the recipient by reducing the
state tax liability and any corresponding federal
deduction. They enter directly into the federal in-
come tax calculation only when the taxpayer re-
ceives something more, in the form of a right to a
refund from the state or the proceeds of a sale of the
credit. Current authority treats gain on the sale of
the credit as capital gain but fails to take account of
the prior accession to wealth that occurs when the
credit matures into a tradable property.
27CCA 200211042.
28See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1962). 29See Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).
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